We study a central problem in Algorithmic Mechanism Design: constructing truthful mechanisms for welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders. Dobzinski, Nisan, and Schapira provided the first mechanism that guarantees a non-trivial approximation ratio of O(log 2 m) [STOC'06], where m is the number of items. This was subsequently improved to an approximation factor of O(log m log log m) [Dobzinski, APPROX'07] and then to O(log m) [Krysta and Vocking, ICALP'12].
INTRODUCTION
The economic field of Mechanism Design mainly deals with games where each strategic participant privately holds some information. The paradigmatic example is a single item auction, where bidders are interested in an item that is for sale. The value of each bidder for the item is unknown to the other bidders. The mechanism design question is to find an auction format that will achieve a certain social goal. Archetypal examples are Vickrey's second-price auction [22] that maximizes the welfare and Myerson's revenue maximizing auctions [21] .
Since the introduction of these classic constructions, we have witnessed the emergence of complex markets such as eBay and Amazon with millions of items that are for sale. Furthermore, auctions have become significantly larger and complicated than before. Examples include spectrum auctions with revenue measured in billions of dollars [5] as well as more recent ones such as the FCC incentive auctions [19] . These markets introduce new challenges that can be very coarsely classified into two. The first type is traditional game theoretic challenges, e.g., bidders have complicated preferences over multiple bundles of items and their private information can no longer be represented by a single number, as in the single item auction case. This considerably limits the set of tools available to the designer. The second type of challenges is computational considerations: some classic designs for these complex settings may have good game theoretic properties but require solving computationally intractable problems, leading to unacceptable running time.
In a sense, the rise of Algorithmic Mechanism Design can be related to the need to simultaneously solve these challenges. A combinatorial auction is a quintessential setting in this field. The basic definition involves a set of M heterogeneous items (|M | = m) and n bidders. Each bidder i has a valuation function vi : 2 M → R. It is assumed that each valuation vi is normalized (vi(∅) = 0) and non decreasing. The usual goal is to find an allocation of the items (A1, . . . , An) that maximizes the social welfare Σivi(Ai). Since we are interested in algorithms that run in time poly(n, m) and the size of the valuation functions is exponential in m, it is common to assume that the valuations are given to us as black boxes that can handle specific types of queries. The two standard queries are value queries (given a bundle S, return v(S)) and demand queries (given prices p1, . . . , pm return arg maxS v(S) − Σj∈Spj).
To handle the strategic behavior of the bidders we charge each bidder i some payment pi for the bundle Ai he re-Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from Permissions@acm.org. ceived. We are looking for truthful mechanisms, where the profit vi(Ai) − pi of each bidder is maximized when answering queries according to his true valuation.
Numerous variations on the basic problem were studied (see, e.g., the survey [2] and references within), but most of them demonstrate the basic clash that is in the heart of Algorithmic Mechanism Design: the VCG mechanism is a truthful mechanism that maximizes the welfare but requires finding the welfare maximizing allocation, which is usually NP-hard. On the other hand, good constant factor approximation algorithms exist but are not truthful. The goal is therefore to design truthful mechanisms with approximation ratios close to what is possible from a pure algorithmic point of view that completely ignores incentives issues.
The Main Result: Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Valuations
The case where all valuations are submodular (for every S and T , v(S) + v(T ) ≥ v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T )) stands out as a showcase for the power and limitations of computationally efficient truthful mechanism design. The pure algorithmic aspect of the problem has received much attention as well (e.g., [15, 18, 20, 16] ). Of particular importance is Vondrak's continuous greedy algorithm [23] that was initially developed for this setting and its numerous extensions to other problems and follow-ups. The algorithmic situation is quite well understood and can be summarized as follows: there is an e e−1 -approximation algorithm that uses polynomially many value queries, and this ratio is tight [16, 20] . If the more stronger demand queries are allowed then it is possible to break the e e−1 -barrier and achieve an approximation ratio of e e−1 − 10 −6 [15] , but it is impossible to get an approximation ratio better than 2e 2e−1 with polynomially many queries [12] .
Much less is known about the approximation ratio achievable by polynomial time truthful mechanisms. If access to the valuations is restricted to value queries, then deterministic mechanisms cannot achieve an approximation ratio of m 1 2 − [8] , which matches the ratio obtained by [10] . It is therefore natural to consider randomized mechanisms. There are two important notions of randomized truthful mechanisms. Truthful in expectation mechanisms guarantee that bidding truthfully maximizes the expected profit. In particular, these mechanisms are inapplicable when bidders are not risk neutral. In contrast, universally truthful mechanisms are simply a probability distribution over deterministic mechanisms, and thus it is always better to bid truthfully, regardless of the attitude towards risk.
The first truthful mechanism with non-trivial guarantee was obtained by [11] , which shows that there is a randomized universally truthful mechanism that guarantees an approximation ratio of O(log 2 m). This approximation ratio was later improved to O(log m log log m) [7] and then to O(log m) [17] . All the above mentioned mechanisms use both demand and value queries.
There were reasons to believe that the "correct" approximation ratio for this problem is O(log m) and that the lack of improvement is due to our usual inability to prove impossibility results on the power of truthful polynomial time mechanisms. For example, both [11] and [7] essentially use a fixed price auction with the same price for each item, and it is not hard to see that such auctions cannot guarantee more than a logarithmic approximation. Furthermore, the analysis is based on a comparison to a "revenue benchmark", and it is known that the gap between the welfare and the revenue might be logarithmic (the so called equal revenue distribution). In a similar vein, the analysis of the algorithm of [17] is essentially based on the observation that one can approximate the welfare well in "easy" instances when there are logarithmically many copies of each good. Unfortunately, the welfare gap between an easy instance and the same instance with only one copy of each good can be logarithmic.
Even considering the weaker concept of truthfulness in expectation does not seem to help much. The notable positive result here restricts the valuations to be sum of matroid rank functions. In this case, there is a truthful in expectation that provides an approximation ratio of e e−1 [13] . However, for general submodular valuations the best known bound is only O( log m log log m ) [9] and even this ratio is obtained by a mechanism that uses non-standard queries.
Despite this, in this paper we are able to break the logarithmic barrier:
Theorem: There exists a randomized universally truthful algorithm for combinatorial auctions with XOS valuations that achieves an expected approximation ratio of O( √ log m). The algorithm makes poly(m, n) value and demand queries 1 .
Notice that the new mechanism (as well as all previous ones) actually works for the larger class of XOS (a.k.a. fractionally subadditive) valuations. A valuation v is additive if for every bundle S we have that v(S) = Σj∈Sv({j}). A valuation v is XOS if there exist additive valuations a1, . . . , at such that for every bundle S, v(S) = maxr ar(S). Each ar is a clause of v. If a ∈ arg maxr ar(S) then a is a maximizing clause of S and a(j) is the supporting price of item j in this maximizing clause.
Intuition for the Mechanism
A basic construction used in our mechanism is a fixed price auction. In this auction there is a price pj for each item j. Initially, M = M . Bidders arrive one by one, in an arbitrary order. Each bidder i that arrives to the auction takes some bundle Si ⊆ M that maximizes his profit: Si ∈ arg maxS[vi(S) − Σj∈Spj]. Let M = M − Si and consider the next bidder in the order. At the end of the auction each bidder i receives the set Si and pays Σj∈S i pj. Observe that the fixed price auction is truthful as long as no participating bidder affects p1, . . . , pm. Also note that to implement the auction we need one demand query for each participating bidder. 1 The probability of success for which the mechanism provides a good approximation ratio was also studied in few cases [11, 7] . In our case, using standard arguments we get that the probability that the mechanism will provide at least half of its expected value is Ω( 1 √ log m ). Notice that unlike traditional algorithm design running a truthful mechanism more than once usually destroys its incentive properties. In principle, we believe that it should be possible to imrpove the probability of success of our mechanisms using techniques similar to those of [11, 7] . However, we do not push this direction in the current manuscript in order to keep our construction a bit simpler. Finally, we note that the probability of success of the mechanism obtained in [17] is Θ( 1 log m ).
Let us first see how to obtain a logarithmic approximation to the social welfare using a fixed-price auction 2 , and then discuss how to improve the approximation ratio. For simplicity of presentation assume that all values in the additive valuations that the XOS valuations are constructed from are integers in {1, 2, 4, 8, . . . , m}.
Let (O1, . . . , On) be an optimal allocation and ai be the maximizing clause of Oi in the valuation vi of bidder i. For each bidder i and j ∈ Oi, let qj = ai({j}). Notice that OP T = Σivi(Oi) = Σjqj. The basic idea is to find prices p1, . . . , pm such that a fixed price auction will output an allocation with high welfare. Towards this end, we say that we have "correctly guessed" the price of item j if qj = 2 · pj. It was already observed (e.g., [11, 7] -see also Lemma 4 of this paper) that the welfare obtained by a fixed price auction with prices p1, . . . , pm is at least 2 · Σ j|q j =2·p j qj. Therefore, our approach is to maximize the total value of correctly guessed items. Notice that in the analysis we conservatively ignore the contribution of items that were not correctly guessed regardless of whether their price is "too high" or "too low".
We first explore the possibility of using a uniform price for all items. Partition the optimal allocation into bins: put all items j with qj = r in bin Gr. Let cont(Gr) = |{j|qj = r}| · r denote the contribution of bin Gr to the optimal solution. As discussed above, the welfare of a fixed price auction with price per item r/2 is Ω(cont(Gr)). Thus, since Σrcont(Gr) = OP T and since there are log m bins by assumption, the expected approximation ratio of a fixed-price auction with a random price r/2 is O(log m).
To improve the approximation ratio, we group every √ log m consecutive bins to a single chunk, so that we have √ log m disjoint chunks. For each chunk B k , denote by val(B k ) = ΣG r ∈B k cont(Gr) the sum of contributions of bins that are in B k . Notice that we cannot guarantee now that there is a fixed price auction with a uniform price that generates welfare of val(B k ), since a chunk consists of multiple bins that contain items with different qj's. However, we might get lucky: let r k be the smallest price of a bin in B k . If a fixed price auction with uniform price r k /2 returns welfare of Ω(val(B k )), we say that B k is easily approximable. Let Z denote the set of chunks that are not easily approximable.
In the very lucky case,
Similarly to before, in this case we get an approximation ratio of O( √ log m) by choosing uniformly a random a chunk B k out of the √ log m chunks and running a fixed price auction with price r k /2 for all items.
The situation is more complicated when
Our goal now is to run a fixed price auction that uses multiple prices. Key in this plan is Lemma 5 that considers a fixed price auction with a uniform price r k /2 where bidders arrive in a random order. Let the output of this auction be (T1, . . . , Tn), so T = ∪iTi is the set of items that were allocated in the fixed-price auction. The lemma roughly says that if chunk B k is not easily approximable then E[Σj∈T qj] = Ω(val(B k )). Notice that this does not imply that the welfare Σivi(Ti) of the fixed price auction is large: in an extreme case all items j in the chunk have qj = r k · 2 √ log m whereas the fixed price auction allocates all 2 This slightly improves over the results of [11, 7] in which an O(log m log log m) approximation ratio was obtained by using a fixed price auction. The logarithmic approximation of [12] is obtained via a more complicated auction. items to some bidder i with vi(Ti) = |Ti| · r k /2. However, the lemma does imply that the set T contains items that contribute much of the value of chunk B k . Therefore, we can "guess" the price of all items in T , hoping to correctly guess the price of items that are also in chunk B k . The point is that there are only √ log m bins in a chunk, so in expectation we correctly guess the price of items that contribute value Ω( val(B k ) √ log m ). The overall plan is to run a fixed price auction with price r k /2 on every chunk B k in an increasing order of k, and guess the price of all items that were allocated in the auction. In general, some items that were correctly guessed in some fixed price auction with price r k /2 might be (incorrectly) re-priced in one of the following fixed-price auction with price r k /2 for k > k. However, we are able to bound the loss of such re-pricing by making sure that r k >> r k . We show, very roughly speaking, that the total number of items allocated in each fixed-price auction shrinks dramatically, and therefore the number of items that are re-priced is bounded.
All this hints that we can correctly guess the price of many items and have that Σ j|q j =2·p j qj = Ω( OP T √ log m ). Ideally, we would like to run a fixed price auction with these prices, but recall that a fixed price auction is truthful only when the prices do not depend on the participants' valuations, which is not the case here. Furthermore, how can we determine whether the easily approximable chunks are significant or not? The second issue turns out to be easy to solve, as we can "guess" whether the easily approximable chunks are significant or not simply by flipping a random coin. The solution of the first issue is standard, although the analysis is a bit more delicate than the usual: we use only half of the bidders in the fixed price auctions that are used to guess prices. After guessing the pj's, we run a final fixed-price auction where the participants are the other half of bidders that were not involved in determining the pj's. This guarantees the truthfulness of the mechanism. The reader is referred to the technical parts for a complete description and analysis of the mechanism.
Budget Additive Bidders
As noted above, our mechanism assumes that the valuations are given as black boxes that can only be accessed via demand queries. However, sometimes the valuations are explicitly given but simulating a demand query might be NP hard. One extensively studied case (e.g., [1, 4, 3] ) is when all valuations are budget additive: there exists some b such that for every bundle S, v(S) = min(b, Σj∈Sv({j})). A simple reduction from, say, the knapsack problem shows that simulating a demand query is NP hard. Yet, we observe that our mechanism uses demand queries of a very specific form, and these can be computed in polynomial time. Hence:
Theorem: There exists a polynomial time randomized universally truthful algorithm for combinatorial auctions with budget additive valuations that achieves an expected approximation ratio of O( √ log m).
Open Questions
The obvious question that we leave open in this paper is determining whether Θ( √ log m) is the best possible approximation ratio in our setting. Our mechanism uses both randomization and demand queries, but -as far as impossibility results are concerned -all we know is that deterministic mechanisms that use only value queries cannot obtain an approximation ratio of O(m 1 2 − ) [8] . This result was extended to randomized mechanisms that use value queries [14] (with a constant in the exponent that is smaller than 1 2 ). In particular, we note that nothing is known even about the power of deterministic mechanisms that use demand queries (but we conjecture that there is not much to gain here). The interested reader is referred to [6] for possible approaches for proving impossibility results for computationally efficient truthful mechanisms in general, and for mechanisms that use only demand and value queries -as the mechanism introduced in this paper -in particular.
We do not know whether our results can be extended to subadditive valuations. The best known O(log m log log m)approximation algorithm [7] relies on the fact that for every subadditive valuation there is an XOS valuation that O(log m)-approximates it 3 . Thus a logarithmic factor loss seems inevitable using this approach. Breaking the logarithmic barrier also for subadditive valuations looks challenging.
PRELIMINARIES

Allocations and Bins
Let A = (A1, . . . , An) be some allocation. Let |A| denote Σivi(Ai) rounded up to the nearest power of 2. Let P =
Suppose that all valuations are XOS and let qj denote the supporting price of j in Ai, for every i and item j ∈ Ai. Let q j be the maximal value in P such that qj ≥ q j .
It will be convenient not to work directly with the set P but rather with bins that reference |A| only indirectly.
Specifically, bin k of the allocation A is k is p(k) = 2 k |A| m 2 (we will also refer to this price as the price of bin k in A). We say that item j is in bin k if q j = p(k). Let n k be the number of items in bin k. The contribution of bin k in A is p(k) · n k .
We say that the allocation T = (T 1 , . . . , T n ) is the allocation T = (T1, . . . , Tn) restricted to a set of bins B if for each i we have that T i = Ti ∩ M b , where M b is the set of items that are in some bin in B in the allocation (T1, . . . , Tn). We say that an allocation T = (T1, ..., Tn) is supported by prices p 1 , . . . , p m if for each item j ∈ Ti we have that qj ≥ p j , where qj is the supporting price of item j in Ti according to vi. Note that we do not assume that every item j is allocated in T .
Truthfulness
Let V be some set of valuations. An n-bidder mechanism for combinatorial auctions is a pair (f, p) where f : V n → A, where A is the set of all allocations, and p = (p1, . . . , pn), where pi : V n → R.
is universally truthful if it is a probability distribution over truthful deterministic mechanisms.
THE MECHANISM
We now provide a description of the mechanism. Let α = √ log m. 3 A valuation v α-approximates a valuation v if for every bundle S it holds that v(S) ≤ v (S) ≤ α · v(S).
1. With probability 1/2 sell the grand bundle M via a second price auction with the participation of all bidders. The mechanism ends in this case with the allocation and prices of this second-price auction.
2. Each bidder is assigned independently with equal probability to exactly one of the following three groups: STAT, UNIFORM, and FINAL.
3. Run the greedy algorithm of [18] 4 with the participation of bidders in STAT only. 6. Consider each chunk B k , in ascending order:
(a) Let p be the price of the bin with the smallest price in B k . Run a fixed price auction restricted to bidders in UNIFORM with price p /2 for every item, where the order of the bidders in UNIFORM is chosen uniformly at random. Let T k = (T k 1 , . . . , T k n ) be the allocation output and p i,k be the price that each bidder i pays. Theorem 2. The mechanism above is universally truthful and can be implemented with polynomially many demand and value queries. It provides an approximation ratio of O( √ log m).
We first show that the mechanism is truthful and uses a polynomial number of demand queries. For truthfulness, observe that the only way for a bidder to receive some item is by participation in a fixed price auction or a second-price auction, and that the prices of this auction do not depend on his valuation (this in particular includes bidders in UNI-FORM, who despite participating in multiple auctions may win items only in one auction that is determined by the outcome of the random coins). To see that the bound on the number of queries, observe that we run at most α + 1 fixed price auctions, and that each such auction requires at most n demand queries. The next two sections are devoted to proving the approximation ratio.
ANALYSIS OF THE APPROXIMATION RATIO: AUXILIARY LEMMAS
Variants of the next two lemmas have already appeared in the literature multiple times, e.g., [11, 7] (proofs in the appendix):
Lemma 3. Let S be a random set of bidders where bidder i is in S with probability p independently of the other bidders. Let (T1, . . . , Tn) be some allocation and suppose that for every bidder i we have that vi(Ti)
Lemma 4. Let T = (T1, ..., Tn) be an allocation that is supported by prices p 1 , . . . , p m . A fixed price auction with prices pj = p j 2 generates an allocation (S1, . . . , Sn), with Σivi(Si) ≥
The next lemma considers a fixed price auction with a random subset of the bidders that arrive in random order. It compares the quality of the solution to some arbitrary allocation A and shows that we expect to either get an allocation with a welfare close to that of A or that many of the items of A were allocated.
Lemma 5. Let A = (A1, . . . , An) be an allocation that is supported by p 1 , . . . , p m . For every item j ∈ Ai, let qj be its supporting price. Let o = ΣiΣj∈A i qj. Let N be a random set of bidders where each bidder is in N independently at random with probability r. Let T = (T1, . . . , Tn) be the random variable that denotes the allocation of the fixed price auction with price pj = p j 2 for every item j when N is constructed at random as above and the order over bidders in N is chosen uniformly at random. Let
, where expectations is taken over the random choices of N and its internal order.
Proof. Fix N and its internal order. Consider a fixedprice auction as above and denote by (T1, . . . , Tn) the allocation of the fixed-price auction. Let W = ∪ i∈N Ai − ∪ i∈N Ti be the set of items that are allocated to bidders in N in (A1, . . . , An) but were not allocated in the fixed price auction. Our first step is to bound the social welfare of the fixed price auction using W :
Proof. Consider some bidder i ∈ N arriving to the auction. Let A i = W ∩ Ai. Bidder i could have taken the set A i at price Σ j∈A i pj. Observing that vi(A i ) ≥ Σ j∈A i qj ≥ 2Σ j∈A i pj we get that the profit of i from taking A i is at least Σ j∈A i qj/2. Since the bundle Ti was a most profitable bundle for i, its profit must be at least Σ j∈A i qj/2 and in particular we have that vi(Ti) ≥ Σ j∈A i qj/2. Summing up over all bidders in N we get that Σ i∈N vi(Ti) ≥ Σ i∈N Σ j∈A i qj/2 = Σj∈W qj/2.
When E[Σj∈W qj] > o·E[c]
2
(where expectation is taken over the random choice of N and its internal order), the , as needed (the last inequality holds since r ≤ 1).
From now on we assume that E[Σj∈W qj] ≤ o·E[c]
2 . We prove the claim by running the following thought experiment. Choose uniformly at random a bidder i ∈ N − N to arrive to the fixed price auction just after the auction with the bidders in N has ended. We will see that the expected profit of i is is at least o·E [c] 2n , where expectation is taken over the choices of N , its internal order, and i . The expected profit of bidders (in N ) that arrive before i is at least the expected profit of i , simply because the set of available items does not increase during the auction. Since Ti is a profit maximizing bundle of each bidder i and since vi(Ti) is at least its profit, we get that
2n . By linearity of expectation we conclude that
4 , as claimed. Thus, to finish the proof it remains to bound the profit of i :
2n , where expectation is taken over the choices of N , the internal order of N , and i .
Proof. When i arrives the set of available items is M − ∪iTi. The expected value of items that are allocated in A to bidders that are not in N but were not allocated in the fixed price auction is:
2n . Similarly to the proof of Claim 6, observe that for every j, qj ≥ 2pj, and therefore when i arrives to the auction his profit from taking the bundle O i is at least Σj∈O i
Since T i is one of i 's most profitable bundles, T i must be at least as profitable as O i . This finishes the proof of Lemma 5.
ANALYSIS OF THE APPROXIMATION RATIO: THE MAIN PROOF
We put each instance in one of two sets, and show how to get the desired approximation ratio in each set. Let (O1, . . . , On) be an optimal allocation and denote its value
Case I: There is a Dominant Bidder
The first set of instances that we consider is the set of instances with at least one dominant bidder. It is easy to get a good approximation in these instances: with some constant probability in Step 1 we run a second price auction and therefore the bundle of all items will be allocated to bidder that maximizes vi(M ). Bidder i is obviously a dominant bidder. This provides the promised approximation ratio.
Case II: No Dominant Bidder
Suppose that there is no dominant bidder. We assume that the mechanism does not terminate with the secondprice auction of Step 1 and our analysis is conditioned on this event, which occurs with constant probability.
Let O F U = (O F U 1 , . . . , O F U n ) be some allocation restricted to bidders in F IN AL ∪ U N IF ORM . We also assume that O F U is restricted to bins with prices identical to the prices of 1, . . . , 4 log m of the allocation APX. For every bidder i and item j ∈ O F U i , let qj denote the supporting price of j in O F U i . We sometimes abuse notation a bit and use
Definition 8. The value of chunk B k (denoted val(B k ) ) is the sum of the contributions of the bins in B k in the allo-
Definition 9. We say that chunk B k was reached if there was an iteration of the loop of Step 6 of the mechanism where B k was considered (i.e., the mechanism did not terminate earlier). Proof. If chunk B k was not reached then the mechanism terminated at Step 6b in one of the previous iterations. The probability that the mechanism terminates in a given iteration is 1 α (independently of all other events). Thus the probability that the auction did not terminate in all previous iterations is ( 
In particular, the chunk with the largest index is reached with probability at least 1 e . However, for this chunk to be reached all chunks with smaller indices must be reached as well.
Definition 11. Consider a chunk B k . We say that chunk
32
, where T k is the allocation constructed in Step 6b when B k is reached and expectation is taken over the random choices of the bidders in UNIFORM and their internal order.
Let Z be the set of chunks that are not easily approximable. The analysis of case II is divided into two. In the first part, assume that Σ B k / ∈Z val(B k ) ≥ 1 5 · ΣB k ∈Z val(B k ). We will show that the expected welfare in this case is Ω( O F U α ). When Σ B k / ∈Z val(B k ) < 1 5 · ΣB k ∈Z val(B k ), we will show that the expected welfare of the fixed price auction of Step 7 (which is reached with probability 1 e ) is α·O F U 64 log m −α· OP T 4 log 2 m . We will also see that with high probability O F U = Ω(OP T ), which gives an overall approximation ratio of O(α) = O( √ log m).
Case IIa: The Value of Easiliy Approximable Chunks is Large
. For every chunk B k / ∈ Z define E k to be the event in which chunk B k is reached and the mechanism terminates then in Step 6b. Let W k = Pr[E k ] · E[Σivi(T k i )]. Observe that since the E k 's are disjoint the expected welfare of the mechanism is at least Σ k / ∈Z W k . We now compute a lower bound to W k . By Claim 10, B k is reached with probability 1 e . If B k is reached, then with probability 1 α (independently of any other events) the auction ends with the allocation (T k 1 , . . . , T k n ). Since B k is easily approximable in this case we have that in this case E[Σivi(T k i )] ≥ val(B k ) 32
. Thus, for every chunk B k / ∈ Z, W k = val(B k ) 32e·α . Considering that we assume that Σ B k / ∈Z val(B k ) ≥ O F U 6 , we have that the expected welfare of the mechanism is at least
Example 12. Consider a combinatorial auction with n additive bidders and n items. The value of bidder i for each item j = i is vi({j}) = 0. For i = j we have that vi({j}) > 0. For concreteness, let us suppose that each vi({j}) is chosen uniformly at random from the set {1, 2, 4, 8, . . . , m}. Clearly, the optimal solution is to give item i to each player i. Denote the value of the optimal allocation by OP T . Observe that with high probability the value of the optimal welfare restricted to UNIFORM is Θ(OP T ). Moreover every chunk is easily approximable since item i is demanded only by player i. The approximation ratio is therefore O( √ log m). One could attempt to complicate the example and add bidders with "low" values to prevent bidders to take the item they demand by increasing the competition in the fixed price (say, adding a bidder with valuation v(S) = |S|). This might make some chunks not easily approximable. The analysis of the next case shows that we can take advantage of intensive competition by using the bidders in UNIFORM to infer some information about the prices of items in the optimal solution restricted to bidders in FINAL.
Case IIb: The Value of Easily Approximable Chunks is Small
We now assume that Σ B k / ∈Z val(B k ) < 1 5 · ΣB k ∈Z val(B k ). In the analysis of this case we assume that all chunks were reached. By Claim 10 this happens with probability 1 e . We need more notation. . Moreover, the expected sum of available value in all chunks is at least
Proof. We use Lemma 5 for the proof of this claim. Using the notation of the statement of Lemma 5, we let (A1, . . . , An) be the allocation O F U restricted to bins in
32
. Lemma 5 gives that (again using the notation of the statement of the lemma and observing that r = 1 2 , since UNI-FORM is a random group that consists of half of the bidders in F IN AL ∪ U N IF ORM ):
, and thus we get that E[ΣiΣ j∈A i ∩(∪ k T k ) qj] ≥ 3 4 · Σivi(Ai). The first part of the claim follows since M k = ∪iAi. The second part of the claim follows by using linearity of expectation and our assumption that ΣB k ∈Z val(B k ) ≥ 5O F U
6
.
A bin that belongs to chunk B k is colored if it was selected in Step 6c. The set of correctly priced items of a bin that was colored is the set of items C k in that bin that are also in L k (the set of available items of B k ). Correctly priced items are essentially items that we "guessed" their supporting price in the allocation O F U correctly. The next claim shows that we can correctly guess a large chunk of any set R that consists of items that are all available. Eventually, we will set R to be the set of items in O F U that belong to bidders in FINAL.
Proof. Since there are 4 log m α bins in each chunk and the colored bin is chosen uniformly at random, the expected value of the correctly priced items of chunk B k that are also in R is
. The claim now follows by using linearity of expectation.
It is possible that we correctly guessed the price of a certain item, but unfortunately we re-priced it in one of the next iterations. The next lemma bounds the value of items "lost" due to this incorrect re-pricing.
Lemma 16. Consider an iteration k of the mechanism and let M k be the set of items that belong to some chunk B k , k < k and were repriced at price p in Step 6c of iteration k. If α < log m log log m then Σ j∈M k qj ≤ OP T 2 log 2 m . Proof. Observe that since in each chunk only the r'th smallest bin is colored, there are least 4 log m α bins that separate the bin of every item j ∈ M k and the currently colored bin. The price doubles in each consecutive bin, and therefore p ≥ p · 2 4 log m α ≥ p · log 2 m, where p is the largest price of an item in M k before B k is considered. Since the welfare of any allocation is at most OP T :
Observing that 2Σ j∈M k qj ≤ |M k | · p we get that Σ j∈M k qj ≤ OP T 2 log 2 m . Now we are ready to bound the welfare of the final fixed price auction.
Lemma 17. Suppose that the mechanism reaches Step 7. Let A = (A1, . . . , An) be a random variable that denotes a welfare-maximizing allocation among all allocations that are restricted to bidders in F IN AL and are supported by p1, . . . , pm. Then,
Proof. In this proof we denote by Let G be the set of items that were correctly priced and not repriced in later iterations. For each i, let Ai = (O F i ∩ T )−G. Observe that (A1, . . . , An) is supported by p1, . . . , pm. By the discussion above:
Concluding Case II: Existence of an Allocation with High Value
The next lemma is a "standard" random sampling argument with a small addition. Roughly speaking, it considers randomly partitioning a set of bidders to two sets of (almost) equal size -STAT and U N IF ORM ∪ F IN AL. The lemma says that when there is no dominant bidder, we will get a good approximation to the optimum in both sets, even when ignoring items with very low contribution (where contribution is according to the value of the items in the XOS clause). The proof is simple: standard random sampling arguments tell us that the optimal solution restricted to STAT and to F IN AL ∪ U N IF ORM have roughly the same value (OP T S and OP T F U ). However, we have to ignore the contribution of items that are too small (say, below OP T F U /m 2 ) since the mechanism considers only logarithmically many prices. The point is that AP X/m 2 is in the same ballpark of OP T F U /m 2 , so we can use the former as a good approximation to the latter without losing much, recalling that APX is an O(1) approximation to OP T S . This is a good time to note the only information about the allocation APX (that is computed using bidders in STAT) that the algorithm uses is its value. The value of the allocation APX is used only to determine the range of prices that will be used in the fixed priced auctions. The algorithm does not make use of the specific allocation of items in APX or other properties of it. Furthermore, suppose that we are given that for every item i and bundle S we have that vi(S) ∈ {0}∪[1, . . . , m] (or, almost equivalently, a good estimate of the optimal solution). In this case we could just let the mechanism consider prices 1, 2, 4, . . . , m without making any use of bidders in STAT. Proof. Let (OP T F U 1 , . . . , OP T F U n ) be an optimal allocation restricted to bidders in F IN AL ∪ U N IF ORM and let (OP T S 1 , . . . , OP T S n ) be the optimal allocation restricted to bidders in ST AT . Applying Lemma 5 twice and using the union bound, with probability 1 − o(1) it holds that:
In particular, the welfare of the allocation OP T F U is high. It remains to show that when restricting OP T F U to bins 1, . . . , 4 log m of AP X we do not lose much. Towards this end, recall that OP T ≥ Σivi(AP Xi) ≥
Thus if the price of bin k in the allocation APX is p(k), and the price of bin k in the allocation OP T S is also p(k), then k + 3 ≥ k ≥ k − 3. Moreover the difference between every two bins in AP X and OP T S that share the same price is the same and equals k − k .
Observe that for any allocation A, bins with indices larger 2 log m + 3 are in fact empty in any allocation, since the contribution of every item that belongs to such bin is greater than |A|, which is impossible. Since we restrict our attention to bins 1, . . . , 4 log m, the only items in OP T S that we might miss are those that are in bins with indices at most 4. The next claim shows that this loss is bounded.
Claim 19. Fix an allocation A and let P be the set of items in bins with indices at most 4. Σj∈P qj ≤ 16|A| m . Proof. For every item j in bin k ≤ 4, it holds that qj ≤ 16|A| m 2 . We have at most m items and so the total value of items in these bins is at most m · 16|A| m 2 = 16|A| m .
We can finally define the allocation O F U from the statement of the lemma: it is the allocation OP T F U restricted to bins 5, . . . , 4 log m. By Claim 19 we have that Σivi
≥ OP T 6 · 3 4 = OP T 8 . We now conclude the proof of the approximation ratio for case II. We showed that the expected welfare is at least O F U 192e·α or that we have found prices such that there is an allocation to bidders in FINAL such that the supported value by these prices is at least α·O F U 32·log m − α · OP T 2 log 2 m . By Lemma 18 with very high probability O F U = OP T 8 , thus in the first case we get an expected approximation ratio of O(α) = O( √ log m). In the second case we have that the mechanism reaches the final fixed price auction with probability 1 e , and in this case Lemma 4 gives us that the expected welfare is at least: 
IMPLEMENTATION FOR BUDGET AD-DITIVE BIDDERS
We would like now to implement the mechanism for budget additive bidders. The mechanism uses a polynomial number of value and demand queries. However, in general computing a demand query for budget additive bidders is NP hard. Observe that the algorithm uses only demand queries with prices that can be written pj = c · tj, where c is some constant and tj is some integer between 1 and poly(m). We show that these demand queries can be computed by a polynomial time algorithm, which implies a polynomial time implementation of the mechanism for budget additive bidders. For simplicity we assume below that c = 1. This is without loss of generality since for every budget additive valuation v we can run the algorithm below for the budget additive valuation v where v (s) = v(s)/c. Proposition 20. Let v be a budget additive valuation. Let p1, . . . , pm be integers between 1 and poly(m). A bundle S that maximizes v(S) − Σj∈Spj can be found in time poly(m).
Proof. Notice that the sum of prices of every combination of items can get only poly(m) values. Denote the possible sums by q1, . . . , qt (t = poly(m)). We now use a dynamic programming to find the profit maximizing bundle of items. Define a matrix A of dimensions |M | × t, with the intention to write in cell A(j, k) a value maximizing set S ⊆ {1, . . . , j} such that Σ j ∈S p j ≤ q k . Cells in the first row can be easily computed, and we fill in the next rows one by one using A(j, k) = arg max(v(A(j, k−1)), v(A(j −1, k )+{j})), where k is such that q k = q k − pj.
Corollary 21. There is a universally truthful mechanism for budget additive bidders that provides an expected approximation ratio of O( √ log m).
